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CHARLES SANTIAGO SANDERS PEIRCE (c.1839), son of the mathematician 
Benjamin P., brought up in a circle of physicists and naturalists, and specially 
educated as a chemist, derived his fi rst introduction to philosophy from the 
K.d.R.V. [Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 1781] and other celebrated 
German works, and only later made acquaintance with English, Greek, and 
Scholastic philosophy. Accepting unreservedly Kant’s opinion that the meta-
physical conceptions are merely the logical conceptions diff erently applied, he 
inferred that logic ought to be studied in the spirit of the exact sciences, and 
regarded Kant’s table of functions of judgment as culpably superfi cial. (MS L 
107: 1, 26 October 1904, Auto-Biography for Matthew Mattoon Curtis, Draft  C, 
marked “fi nal” by Peirce.)
Th us begins Peirce’s sketch of his autobiography, which was never published in his 
life time.1 Peirce’s theory of signs is a colossal theory of representation, reasoning, 
meaning, communication and signifi cation, never made available in print in full.2 
1 For partial publications of Peirce’s autobiography in MS L 107, see Ketner 1983 and Stuhr 
1987. Th e present article is a revised and abridged version of the introduction to Peirce’s theory 
of signs that appeared in Pietarinen 2006a, Ch. 1.
2 Th e selections include the Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce (CP), the critical and 
chronological edition of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a Chronological Edition (W), the Essential 
Peirce (EP), PW and SS (see bibliography). Large portions of his writings on the theory of signs 
and semeiotic remain unpublished, with the essential material concerning especially his later 
attempts from 1905 onwards found only in the manuscripts and correspondence (MS, MS L).
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Th e development of his theory of signs was systematic and its erection architectonic. 
Its philosophical underpinnings have their origins in his system of categories. Our 
introduction begins with these categories and then moves on to present some of the 
most noteworthy topics and concepts found in his interrelated kingdoms of the theory 
of signs, logic and semeiotic.
1. Firstness, secondness, thirdness
No reference to categories is possible without a reference to Kant. Kant’s infl uence 
indeed shows up in a number of junctures in Peirce’s philosophy. Th e categories Peirce 
ended up advocating, the cenopythagorean categories, are a simplifi cation of Kant’s 
twelve categories of metaphysics into three: the division of what pertains to the category 
of fi rstness, to the category of secondness, and to the category of thirdness. Th ese 
refer to the three categories of quality, reaction and representation. Th e characteristic 
ontological furniture of these categories can make reference to being of the nature of 
possibility, that of actuality, or that of laws and generalities.
Unlike Kant, Peirce never approved the distinction between things in themselves 
and the phenomenal world. Moreover, Peirce’s categories are not meant to be 
universally applicable to everything there is or may be. Th ey are the most pertinent 
in the branch of philosophy known as phenomenology, or phaneroscopy, as Peirce 
later renamed that study. Th e purpose of phaneroscopy is to contemplate universal 
phenomena and to discern ubiquitous elements of these three categories.
Firstness is the mode or element of being by which any subject is such as it is, 
positively and regardless of everything else; or rather, the category is not bound 
down to this particular conception but is the element which is characteristic and 
peculiar in this defi nition and is a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, 
qualitativeness, absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, 
essence, feeling, etc. (MS L 107: 21)
Firstness contains pure modes of being, objects and things without presupposing 
interventions of the human mind. Th e ideas of “freshness, life, freedom” (CP 1.302, c. 
1894) characterize such modes. What is fi rstness must be unanalysable, immediate and 
simple, and must not depend on cognitions of a mind or actions of an agent. Firstness 
may be a feeling, but it has to be immediate, placed upon a mind that experiences and 
feels in an instantaneous and durationless fashion, without deliberation, recognition 
and interpretation. Examples are “the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a fi ne 
mathematical construction, the quality of falling in love” (CP 1.304, c. 1904), and “a 
feeling of stillness” (CP 8.330, 1904). In the Logic Notebook Peirce speaks of a “fl avor” 
of all that is present, the quality of what is as it is, regardless of anything else: “all that is 
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collectively taken in its absolute simplicity is fl avor”.3 Th e Dao that can be named is not 
the real Dao.4 
Th e second major division of inquiry is “Normative Science, which investigates the 
universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, 
to Truth, Right, and Beauty” (CP 5.121).
Secondness is that mode or element of being by which any subject is such as it is in 
a second subject regardless of any third; or rather, the category is the leading and 
characteristic element in this defi nition, which is prominent in the ideas of dyadic 
relativity or relation, action, eff ort, existence, individuality, opposition, negation, 
dependence, blind force. (MS L 107: 22)
Unlike fi rstness and its still-life quality of the absence of thought and action, 
secondness is the dynamic, two-sided encounter and opposition found in the polarities 
of action-reaction, eff ort-resistance, temporal passing from one instant to another, or 
the contact of the ego (the mind) with the non-ego (the non-mind). All these involve 
the eff ort of acting and perceiving, the struggle to achieve something and to feel 
something, the shock of sensing change. One element in the coupled system desires 
the other; one cymbal rings, but thrown together, two cymbals make a sound. Action 
cannot exist without reaction, eff ort without resistance. Singular things preserve their 
existence only in so far as there is a counterpart that resists or acts against it. When 
we all know beauty as beauty, there arises ugliness. When we all know the good as 
good, there arises evil.
In a letter to Lady Welby, Peirce explains fi rstness, secondness and the transitional 
phase to thirdness in an irresistible way worth quoting in length:
Th e type of an idea of Secondness is the experience of eff ort, prescinded from the 
idea of a purpose. It may be said that there is no such experience, that a purpose is 
always in view as long as the eff ort is cognized. Th is may be open to doubt; for in 
sustained eff ort we soon let the purpose drop out of view. However, I abstain from 
psychology which has nothing to do with ideoscopy. Th e existence of the word eff ort 
is suffi  cient proof that people think they have such an idea; and that is enough. Th e 
experience of eff ort cannot exist without the experience of resistance. Eff ort only is 
eff ort by virtue of its being opposed; and no third element enters. Note that I speak 
of the experience, not of the feeling, of eff ort. Imagine yourself to be seated alone at 
night in the basket of a balloon, far above earth, calmly enjoying the absolute calm 
and stillness. Suddenly the piercing shriek of a steam-whistle breaks upon you, and 
3 MS 339: 222r, 22 July 1902. I abbreviate the Logic Notebook as LN, followed, when provided, 
by page, date and title.
4 References to Dao De Jing are from the translations by Lin Yutang, Th e Wisdom of Laotse, 
Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2009.
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continues for a good while. Th e impression of stillness was an idea of Firstness, a 
quality of feeling. Th e piercing whistle does not allow you to think or do anything 
but suff er. So that too is absolutely simple. Another Firstness. But the breaking of the 
silence by the noise was an experience. Th e person in his inertness identifi es himself 
with the precedent state of feeling, and the new feeling which comes in spite of him 
is the non-ego. He has a two-sided consciousness of an ego and a non-ego. Th at 
consciousness of the action of a new feeling in destroying the old feeling is what 
I call an experience. Experience generally is what the course of life has compelled 
me to think. Secondness is either genuine or degenerate. Th ere are many degrees of 
genuineness. Generally speaking genuine secondness consists in one thing acting 
upon another, – brute action. I say brute, because so far as the idea of any law or 
reason comes in, Th irdness comes in. When a stone falls to the ground, the law of 
gravitation does not act to make it fall. Th e law of gravitation is the judge upon the 
bench who may pronounce the law till doomsday, but unless the strong arm of the 
law, the brutal sheriff , gives eff ect to the law, it amounts to nothing. True, the judge 
can create a sheriff  if need be; but he must have one. Th e stone’s actually falling is 
purely the aff air of the stone and the earth at the time. Th is is a case of reaction. 
So is existence which is the mode of being of that which reacts with other things. 
But there is also action without reaction. Such is the action of the previous upon the 
subsequent. (CP 8.330, 1904, Letter to Welby)
Numerous threads run wild in this lengthy passage, including the distinction between 
generate and degenerate forms of secondness. Th is split is explained below; Peirce needed 
it to avoid the pitfalls of demarcating what belongs to secondness and what to thirdness. 
He also mentions ideoscopy, which “consists in describing and classifying the ideas that 
belong to ordinary experience or that naturally arise in connection with ordinary life, 
without regard to their being valid or invalid or to their psychology” (CP 8.328). 
Clearly psychology is not of aid in the eff ort of providing basic principles for 
logical and semeiotic theory. How Peirce avoids psychological notions in his all-
pervading concept of the sign is worth noting. He says “that a Sign brings a Second, 
its Object, into cognitive relation to a Th ird”, “that a Sign brings a Second into the 
same relation to a fi rst in which it stands itself to that First”, and that “if we insist on 
consciousness, we must say what we mean by consciousness of an object. Shall we say 
we mean Feeling? Shall we say we mean association, or Habit?”5 Instead of implying 
psychological undertones, Peirce emphasized communicational relations that mark 
5 See Pietarinen 2014b for a complete transcription of MS 499, 1906, On the System of 
Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic. MS 499 is a 
follow-up of MS 498 (On Existential Graphs as an Instrument of Logical Research). Prepared as 
introductory remarks for the address to the 1906 meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, 
MS 490, wrongly titled and inappropriately transcribed in CP as [Introduction to Existential 
Graphs and an Improvement on the Gamma Graphs], is the version Peirce ended up presenting 
at the April meeting in Washington, D.C.
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connections between signs and minds. His terminology refers to cognitions as well 
as to the mental, but in the context of his theory of signs that talk does not take us 
into the realm of psychology.
Resistance to psychology is reminiscent of Kant’s conviction of the absurdity of 
admitting logic to be governed by psychological facts:
Some logicians presuppose psychological principles in logic. But to bring such 
principles into logic is as absurd as taking morality from life. If we took the 
principles from psychology, i.e. from observations about our understanding, we 
would merely see how thinking occurs and how it is under manifold hindrances 
and conditions; this would therefore lead to the cognition of merely contingent 
laws. In logic, however, the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, 
not how we think, but how we ought to think. (Kant 1988[1783]: 16)
Th e seeds of another of Peirce’s doctrines are clear in the last sentence: logic, like 
ethics, is a normative science. Th is idea was absorbed well by Frank Ramsey, who 
transferred Peirce’s thoughts to Wittgenstein who began to show signs of appreciating 
them. In linguistics, parallel discussions on the normative basis of language emerged 
in the wake of the early structuralist-functionalist-conventionalist debates, only to be 
brushed aside from the mainstream linguistics just as they were from the better part 
of the 20th-century formalist approaches to logic, philosophy and science.
Th e above quotation from Peirce’s letter continues with a discussion of whether the 
idea of determination by action involving considerations of time – the previous upon 
the subsequent – is the “pure idea of secondness” or whether it involves thirdness. Th e 
Kantian sense was that indeterminacy belongs to the future: it is an idea that does 
not concern existence, and only existence is determinate. Peirce remained indecisive 
about whether there could be something in the secondness/thirdness interface that 
arises in contemplating “action without reaction”.
Be this as it, Peirce describes a distinct category of thirdness in his autobiography 
as follows:
Th irdness is that mode or element of being whereby a subject is such as it is 
to a second and for a third; or rather, it is the characteristic ingredient of this 
defi nition, which is prominent in the ideas of instrument, organon, method, 
means, mediation, betweenness, representation, communication, community, 
composition, generality, regularity, continuity, totality, system, understanding, 
cognition, abstraction, etc. (MS L 107: 22–23)
Peirce took the category of thirdness to be of utmost importance in philosophy. 
It stands out in the ideas that our minds produce. It is something that cannot be 
reached by the sole consideration of secondness. Peirce had many reasons to favour 
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this category, but the truly compelling one is the proof which he set up in the algebraic 
and diagrammatic systems, that triadic relations are irreducible to monadic and dyadic 
relations. In any triadic relation, Peirce claimed, there in fact is an element of the 
mental. A case in point is the three-place relation of giving, such as in “giving a horse 
to a trainer”. It involves a law that makes the receiver (here the indirect object “a 
trainer”) a possessor of something (the absolute term “a horse”) by the sender’s action. 
Th e relation of giving cannot be reduced to two identities of (1) one agent putting away 
a thing and (2) the other agent receiving the thing at a later date.
Th e third division thus comes to concern metaphysics, which “endeavors to 
comprehend the Reality of Phenomena. Now Reality is an aff air of Th irdness as 
Th irdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and Firstness” (CP 5.121). 
Semiotically, the sign-object-interpretant trichotomy, explained below, belongs here: 
“In its genuine form, Th irdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its 
object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode 
of being of a sign. A sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object. A 
Th ird is something which brings a First into relation to a Second” (CP 8.332, 1904). 
Interpretants and their endless varieties are also described later; essentially, they 
embrace things such as thoughts, actions, experiences, and qualities of feeling. Th e 
Spirit of the Valley never dies.
2. Speculative grammar, critic, methodeutic 
Th e second major division of inquiry, theoretical normative science or the science of 
what ideals things ought to possess, falls into three parts: esthetics, ethics and logic 
(CP 1.191, 1903). Peirce focused much of his energies on developing the third part, 
logic, conceived as semeiotic: it is the art of reasoning and the theory of self-controlled, 
deliberate thought.6
Logic as semeiotic is divided into three broad subjects. Th e fi rst is speculative 
grammar (pure grammar, stecheotic, stoicheiology). It aims to ascertain what is true of 
signs (representamens) so that they can embody any meaning (CP 2.229, c.1897). Th e 
second is critic (logic proper, stoecheology), the science of classifying arguments and 
their validity and degree of force. Critic is aimed at ascertaining what is true of signs 
so that they may hold good of objects. Th e third is speculative rhetoric (methodeutic, 
transuasional logic, methodic, methodology), which is the study of methods in the 
application of truth and about the reference of signs to what they aim at determining, 
6 When Peirce writes “logic” he almost invariably also means semeiotics, “the doctrine of the 
necessary principles of signs”. See MS L 427: 2, Letter to Charles Augustus Strong, 25 July 1904; cf. 
MS L 75.
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namely the interpretants. Rhetoric is the study of meaning in its full sense, aiming 
at ascertaining the ways in which signs beget other signs and thoughts beget other 
thoughts.
Th e Logic Notebook proposes the following classifi cation (LN: 145r, 29 September 
1898): (1) Speculative grammar studies quality, collection, dyadic relation, and triadic 
relation of copies. (2) Logic proper deals with terms (rhemas), propositions and 
inferences (see below). (3) Speculative rhetoric concerns methodology, applications 
of logic to mathematics and other areas of inquiry, and logic in its objective sense. 
He noted that the term speculative rhetoric “is bad”, however, and a few years later 
coined methodeutic to take its place.
Peirce’s semeiotic covers a vast panorama of human inquiry, and is applicable to 
virtually any discipline and branch of scientifi c and human inquiry. Charles W. Morris 
notwithstanding, Peirce’s trivium-based division of semeiotic into grammar, logic and 
rhetoric is not to be narrowly equated with that of syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
3. Signs, objects, interpretants 
A sign, that sweeping and sublime centerpiece of Peirce’s architectonics, appears to 
be practically anything. We should resist the temptation. But having a wide notion of 
signs at our disposal is an asset onto which we can project many restrictions. For its 
essence is in representation: a sign stands to something for something in some respect 
or capacity (CP 2.228, c. 1897). Th is one of the most oft en quoted explanations of signs 
“standing for something” needs a specifi cation. For example, ‘representamen’ has a 
more limited and technical meaning.
Th at for which a sign stands is its object, with reference to some idea, impression, 
perception or essence. Signs create in the minds of their interpreters other signs, called 
their interpretants. In the earlier expositions of his theory of signs he talks about the 
grounds of representamens. Later he included grounds in interpretants. Th e reference 
of the object to an idea can be something that is shared between the interpreters who 
conceive that idea. 
Th e nature of signs is admittedly made Delphic by Peirce’s surprising list of 
what counts as signs. He claims that a human being, the universe, the thoughts, 
and our knowledge are all signs. It turns out that at least experience and habit, two 
cornerstones of Peirce’s thought, do not fall under the umbrella of signs. Every sign 
has its representative quality, its meaning. Meaning, in turn, is a habit, and it is derived 
from experience. Experience is a reaction between two phases of the mind, the ego 
and the non-ego, and thus exemplifi es secondness. Pure quality, without the presence 
of a contemplating mind, is fi rstness. Habit, connected with the mind, is thirdness. 
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Peirce believed that we have direct, non-a priori knowledge of all these three 
categories, and that they must for that reason be beyond doubt (MS 8: 5–6, 1902, On 
the Foundations of Mathematics). Th e direct knowledge of signs is the thought, the 
knowledge of a reaction is experience, and the knowledge of quality is the feeling it 
creates. Beyond these, the metaphysics that takes these categories and applies them to the 
totality of the universe is “inferential”, by which Peirce means metaphysics as something 
that represents the processes of coming to have knowledge obtained through signs.
Signs are the only medium through which to bring about and communicate such 
knowledge. Peirce remarked in several places that “signs are a species of medium of 
communication” (MS 283: 106, 1905, Th e Basis of Pragmaticism; cf. MS 793, probably 
1906, [On Signs]). In this sense, they are the third element that occupies the space 
between objects and interpretants. But if signs are a species of a medium, what else is 
there in communicational situations other than signs that mediate something, and 
presumably mediate something other than knowledge? For Peirce indeed argues that 
all our knowledge and thought is acquired through signs (CP 8.332).
Even more overtly, he remarks in several places that every thought is a sign, or in 
fact in a more qualifi ed sense, that every thought is in signs. Ways of communicating 
some other things than those that cater for knowledge are disconnected from thought. 
Such an exceptional type of knowledge unmediated by signs is instantaneous or direct 
knowledge: something that exemplifi es the content of consciousness. Peirce’s claim 
that we do possess such direct or unmediated knowledge of the three cenopythagorean 
categories seems to mean that exceptional type.
In an early article “Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man” (CP 
5.265, 1868)7 Peirce addressed the question of whether it is at all possible to think 
without signs:
From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought 
must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the 
essence of a sign. Th is, aft er all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in 
intuition, i.e., in the immediate present, there is no thought, or, that all which is 
refl ected upon has past. Hinc loquor inde est. Th at, since any thought, there must 
have been a thought, has its analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there 
must have been an infi nite series of times. To say, therefore, that thought cannot 
happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every 
thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs.
One uses thought to analyse and interpret thought: there is no other way. Still, logic 
dictates that it is not exactly the same thought that analyses the thought. Th inking 
is a real, temporal activity, where what is interpreted follows the other in succession, 
7 Th e paper appeared in 1868 in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2: 103–114.
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while the former becomes the representation of the latter. A thought is the sign of its 
interpretation, or its conclusion.
Signs should not be mistaken for concrete things (MS 9: 1, c.1903, Foundations 
of Mathematics). Th ey are representations capable of being repeatedly produced 
and uttered: being precisely alike does not preclude representing separate things. 
Propositions, which are true or false, or rather are signs capable of turning out to be 
true or false, are perfections of signs in that they distance themselves from their objects 
in order to exhibit and produce their representational capacities. A sign is intended to 
determine, in the minds of its interpreter, its interpretant, which is not identical to the 
sign that represents or gives rise to it. Even in its most imaginary form, the purpose of 
the sign is to “communicate ideas” (MS 283: 101) from one state of mind to another, 
future state of mind. A sign is an “implement of intercommunication” (MS 283: 106), 
a version of a medium of communication. 
In some writings Peirce describes a sign as a “determination of a quasi-mind” 
(MS 283: 131). Precisely what can be meant by such a determination was a constant 
struggle. He despaired of clarifying this in MS 283 and elsewhere. One of his attempts 
articulates thought as a determination of something that “corresponds” to a mind or a 
quasi-mind.8 What he was assured of is that the conception of the quasi-mind is best 
reached through his logical system of existential graphs (MS 282; Pietarinen 2005b, 
2006a). In brief, the quasi-mind, which itself is a sign or a determinable sign, is what 
the sheet of assertion in that system represents, the sheet upon which the graphs are 
scribed and which has the potentiality of representing all truths.
An excerpt from one of Peirce’s numerous letters to Welby is an instructive 
explanation of the curious interplay of signs, objects and interpretants which is reached 
through a logical analysis of science:
It seems to me that one of the fi rst useful steps toward a science of semeiotic 
(σημειωτική), or the cenoscopic science of signs, must be the accurate defi nition, 
or logical analysis, of the concepts of the science. I defi ne a Sign as anything 
which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other hand so 
determines an idea in a person’s mind, that this latter determination, which I term 
the Interpretant of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A 
sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is 
necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents 
it, from the Dynamical Object, or really effi  cient but not immediately present 
Object. It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the 
Interpretant represented or signifi ed in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, 
or eff ect actually produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of these from 
the Normal Interpretant, or eff ect that would be produced on the mind by the 
8 MS 292: 23, 1906, draft  of Prolegomena. To appear in LoF (Pietarinen 2015).
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Sign aft er suffi  cient development of thought. On these considerations I base a 
recognition of ten respects in which Signs may be divided. I do not say that these 
divisions are enough. But since every one of them turns out to be a triplet, it 
follows that in order to decide what classes of signs result from them, I have 310 or 
59049, diffi  cult questions to carefully consider; and therefore I will not undertake 
to carry my systematical division of signs any further, but will leave that for future 
explorers. (CP 8.343, 1908, Letter to Lady Welby)
Th e last sentence sets out a research project. Apart from the three major ones 
introduced below, namely the rhema–proposition–argument, icon–index–symbol 
and qualisign–sinsign–legisign, later in his life Peirce was working on classifi cations 
of signs into myriad divisions. No consensus exists by precisely which methodological 
principles one should attempt to generate new classifi cations of signs.
Equally pressing is the question of the systematic connection between the theory 
of signs and logic. First of all, the study of signs is to be kept clean of psychological 
infl uences. MS 499 (Pietarinen 2005c, 2014b) describes the goal by stating that, in order 
to see the formal relation of signs to their interpreting minds, one has to disregard 
the qualities of consciousness, the eff ort of attention, and other psychic ingredients of 
reasoning. Nevertheless, a sign cannot function “unless it be ultimately interpreted by 
[a] personal mind; so that if we limit ourselves to concepts, or the mental interpretations 
of signs, we shall therein include every sign that is a sign in actual function, while if 
we consider signs regardless of the relation of each to a mind, we neglect to consider a 
most essential characteristic of signs, and thus make room for errors of logic” (MS 499). 
Mental discourse is admissible in logic while outright psychologism is not; in other 
words, the discourse that imports psychological theories and principles into logical 
lands is debarred. In fact, Peirce was deeply interested in psychology and especially 
in its experimental aspects and took it to be a subject that might eventually contribute 
to logic in some novel ways. But he did not think that what makes logical reasoning 
sound and trustworthy ownes anything to psychological theories.
Ultimately, Peirce came to think that it is his diagrammatic theory of existential 
graphs that provides the key to the logical relationship between signs and the 
interpreting mind (Pietarinen 2006a, 2011a, LoF).
As far as objects in this troika of signs, objects and interpretants are concerned, 
their role can be derived from principles resembling Kant’s Dinge an sich, pure modes 
of being. But unlike Kant, Peirce held it meaningless to think that there are objects 
beyond the reach of intelligent cognition and comprehension. In MS 499, Peirce 
uses slightly diff erent terminology in explaining the triangle of signs, objects and 
interpretants and their interplay, suggesting that “the object of the sign is the sign’s 
determinant; the interpretant is the determinand of the sign”. Th e determinant is 
that which determines something, and the determinand is that which something 
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determines. Being determined by and determining something are in no way complete 
methods of dealing with elements in semeiotic theory, however, as is witnessed by the 
remark that “a sign has an object and an interpretant. In the interpretant, which is a 
partially indeterminate thing, the sign determines a Firstness, not absolute but relative 
to the object. Th e pairedness it brings about is not absolute or brute, but recognizes 
the sign as its creator” (LN: 109r, c. 1898). Pairedness obtains between the object and 
its interpretant, and is mediated by the sign. Signs, so to speak, look backward to the 
object and forward to the interpretant. Th e interpretant is partially indeterminate 
because a sign only determines the fi rstness, or pure qualities, of the object, and the 
secondness and thirdness must sprout from the action of the object with its interpreter 
plus the presence of the mind. Th e latter two are realized only when the semeiotic 
process is present in its full capacity.
In a letter to his former student Christine Ladd-Franklin (Pietarinen 2013b), which 
Peirce wrote to correct an error in one of his earlier letters, the sign–object–interpretant 
relation is expounded from a somewhat diff erent and unprecedented perspective. 
Peirce tells that a sign is an “object made by a party we will call the utterer, and 
determined by his idea, which is the sense or depth of the sign, in order to create 
in the mind of the interpreter an interpretant idea of the same object. Th e object is 
itself really of the nature of a sign, too” (MS L 237: 1, 12 June 1902, Letter to Ladd-
Franklin). Now Peirce admitted that signs may have no utterers, as well as that the 
utterer and the object may be assimilated with one another (Pietarinen 2003b). All 
this is consistent with his earlier views on signs, but an interesting twist is that now 
he admits something more: that signs are objects, and that objects are of the nature 
of signs. Does not this make signs and objects simply identical, depriving semeiotic 
much of its triadic interest? Th e short answer is that signs are not those objects that are 
signs in the exactly same sense in which objects are signs. Th ere is the meta-theoretic 
or meta-semiotic level in the study of signs that takes signs as the object of that study, 
as well as objects of signs that determine (in special senses of that determination) the 
signs as representations of those objects and interpretants.
Another, related point he makes in this letter is that signs in fact possess three 
relations: not only do they, so to speak, look back to the object and forward to the 
interpretant, they also are recursive in relating to their own “senses” or “depths”. Th is 
sense or depth of the sign is its “better self” (MS L 237: 1). Th e analogues to the relation 
between the depth and the sign that he draws are those of “an idea to an ideal” and 
“memory to vivid hallucination”. If such recursions fall within the relation of a sign to 
its interpretant, then they are like that of a “seed to the plant that grows from it”. Th e 
upshot is that signs typically are only incomplete representations of what these other 
relations are. Much like minds, they lack those clear-cut, measurable and observable 
boundaries that we are misled to think they have. Signs elude formal identifi cation 
prior to their submission to rigorous scrutiny and analysis.
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A virtually open-ended number of questions presses in on us on the basic character 
and nature of Peirce’s semeiotic. Some of them are presented below in connection to 
the basic trichotomies. Many such questions were originally posed by Peirce, yet a vast 
number of them were left  unanswered. For example, in the Logic Notebook he asked 
what the object of an imperative sign could be (LN: 254r, 9 October 1905). He noted that 
its interpretant was the desired state of things, but no easy solution was to be found as 
regards its object. Th is is just one example illustrating the unfi nished nature of the system 
which at the same time is capable of bearing endless fruits and not only anticipations 
of the 20th-century rediscoveries in theories of language, semantics and pragmatics, 
logic and communication, and philosophy and logic of science and creative discovery.
4. Rhema, proposition, argument
An important categorization of signs in their reference to their interpretants is into 
rhemas, propositions and arguments.9 Th is trichotomy comprises the major division 
in the meaning-category side of the sign triad. Th ese three ideas were also essential 
in the received conception of modern logic, albeit in a narrower sense. Rhemas were 
typically thought to refer to uninterpreted predicate terms, propositions to assertions 
with propositional content, and arguments to proofs. Yut not only mathematical proofs 
but also derivations, deductions, inductions, abductions, sequents, demonstrations, 
dialogues, disputes and so on are species of arguments or argumentative constructions. 
Oft en such arguments are non-demonstrative, such as in rhetoric or abduction. Yet 
such arguments need not have any less claim for their validity than demonstrative 
reasoning has.
An uninterpreted rhema gives no information about the objects of the sign and 
thus cannot by itself have a truth value. Peirce saw its role in the philosophy of logic 
unmistakable, however, among others in overcoming Kant’s defi cient programme 
of logical analysis. Kant’s construction of concepts was limited to the production of 
representatives in the mind that correspond to individuals. Such a construction can 
use representatives only in the context of proper names, but Peirce broke off  from this 
tradition and thought of the construction of concepts, analogous to Kant’s Anschauung, 
as a selection of not only the representatives of proper names (for rhemas), but also of 
the representatives of indefi nite expressions (for onomas). Peirce’s analytic machinery 
of the existential graphs was calculated to deal with diff erent kinds of indefi nites in 
9 Some alternative terms Peirce used for rhemas are signs of qualitative possibility, rhemes, 
rhemata, terms, seme, sumisign; for propositions signs of fact, dicisigns, dicent signs, phemes; 
and for arguments signs of reason, delomes and suadisigns.
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ways Kant’s weak form of analysis was impotent to accomplish.10 Propositions, in 
contrast, do provide information about the objects of the signs. But both rhemas and 
propositions are would-bes: the former leaves objects and interpretants undetermined 
while the latter leaves its interpretant unrealised.
Symbols, and in some sort other Signs, are either Terms, Propositions, or Arguments. 
A Term is a sign which leaves its Object, and a fortiori its Interpretant, to be what it 
may. A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it denotes, 
called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be what it may. An Argument is a 
sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it 
is intended to determine. Th at which remains of a Proposition aft er removal of 
its Subject is a Term (a rhema) called its Predicate. (CP 2.95, c.1902, General and 
Historical Survey of Logic: Partial Synopsis of a Proposed work in Logic)
According to Peirce, these signs are representamens:
A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An argument 
is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is intended 
to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an argument, but 
which separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema is a 
simple representation without such separate parts. (CP 5.139, 1903, Lectures on 
Pragmatism: Th e Th ree Kinds of Goodness)
Th e notion of interpretant in this triplex typically refers to fi nal interpretants, as it 
concerns the end results of a piece of rational inquiry.
5. Abduction, deduction, induction 
Peirce subdivided simple arguments into three kinds: abduction, deduction and 
induction. My remarks are limited to the question of how Peirce sees these types to 
correlate with the icon–index–symbol triad (of the latter, see below).
10 See Pietarinen 2006a; Bellucci, Pietarinen in press. In brief, the spots in existential graphs 
are of two kinds, rhemata or onomata. In contrast to rhemas, whose blanks are fi lled with 
proper names, onomas admit of indefi nites: “Each onoma is an arbitrary index of an indefi nite 
individual. A connecting line may abut upon it, and this has the eff ect of attaching the onoma, 
as a designation, to the individual which that line denotes. I usually write capital letters for 
onomata. A spot has a defi nite place upon its periphery, called a hook, corresponding to each 
blank; and to each hook an extremity of a line of connection may be attached with the eff ect of 
fi lling the blank with a designation of the individual denoted by the line” (MS 491: 3–4). What 
is common in both rhemas and onomas is that they are incomplete predicates and get their 
values from the dialogic and semeiotic process of selecting proper names and indefi nites.
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An abductive argument has a relation of similarity between the facts stated in the 
premisses and the facts stated in the conclusion, without compelling one to accept 
the truth of the conclusion when the premises are true. Peirce states that the facts 
in the premisses of an abductive argument constitute an icon of the facts in the 
conclusion, asserted positively and admitted with suitable inclination. It is in this 
sense that abduction starts a new idea; in Peirce’s words, it is “originary” (CP 2.96; 
Ma, Pietarinen in press).
Deduction is “an argument representing facts in the Premiss, such that when we 
come to represent them in a Diagram we fi nd ourselves compelled to represent the 
fact stated in the Conclusion” (CP 2.96). Th e notion of index arises here, in that “the 
Conclusion is drawn in acknowledgment that the facts stated in the Premiss constitute 
an Index of the fact which it is thus compelled to acknowledge” (CP 2.96). It is in this 
sense that deduction is demonstrative reasoning, in Peirce’s terms “obsistent” and 
“compulsive” (see Bellucci, Pietarinen “Charles Sanders Peirce: Logic”).11 
Induction is an argument starting from a hypothesis that is a result of abduction, 
interspersed with results of possible experiments deduced from hypotheses and 
selected independently of any epistemic access to its truth value. Peirce called them 
“virtual predictions”. Th e hypothesis is concluded “in the measure in which those 
predictions are verifi ed, this conclusion, however, being held subject to probable 
modifi cation to suit future experiments” (CP 2.96). Th e relation between the facts 
stated in the premisses and the facts stated in the conclusion of inductive arguments 
is symbolic, as “the signifi cance of the facts stated in the premisses depends upon their 
predictive character, which they could not have had if the conclusion had not been 
hypothetically entertained” (CP 2.96). In Peirce’s terminology, inductive arguments 
are “transuasive” in their assurance of the amplifi cation of positive knowledge.
6. Icon, index, symbol 
Inherent in the above distinction is the triad of index, icon and symbol. Peirce held this 
to be a central trichotomy in the object-category side of the sign triad. It is explained 
in a draft  of his famous article “A guess at the riddle”, one of his attempts to unify and 
draw together his thought, as follows:12
Th ere may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signifi ed; 
in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connection; in 
that case, the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact 
11  Bellucci, Francesco; Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko “Charles Sanders Peirce: Logic” has been retrieved 
from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/peir-log/. 
12 Cf. MS 909, A Guess at the Riddle; CP 1.354–416; EP 1: 245–279; W 6: 166–210.
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that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name [or 
symbol]. Now consider the diff erence between a logical term, a proposition, and 
an inference. A term is a mere general description, and as neither icon nor index 
possesses generality, it must be a name; and it is nothing more. A proposition is 
also a general description, but it diff ers from a term in that it purports to be in a 
real relation to the fact, to be really determined by it; thus, a proposition can only 
be formed of the conjunction of a name and an index. An inference, too, contains 
a general description. (MS 909; CP 1.372, 1887–88).
A related composition provides an explication of icons, indices and symbols:
Th ere are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all reasoning; the 
fi rst is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the 
subject of discourse; the second is the index, which like a pronoun demonstrative 
or relative, forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing 
it; the third [or symbol] is the general name or description which signifi es its object 
by means of an association of ideas or habitual connection between the name and 
the character signifi ed. (CP 1.369, c.1885)
All reasoning is diagrammatic and iconic, Peirce maintains. Indexical signs such as 
those exhibited in demonstratives, anaphoric pronouns and intentional statements 
may have some very concrete or even physical connection to objects, yet are diffi  cult 
to comprehend by automated reasoning systems. Th e reason is that what is meant by a 
“physical connection” is not unique. Research on automated reasoning systems came 
to adopt the symbolic aspect of the sign as dominant, but it did so for largely misplaced 
reasons as symbols were thought to be easier to handle by standard techniques such 
as conventions, recursion and implicit defi nitions.
7. Genuine and degenerate signs
According to Peirce, signs may also be genuine or degenerate, and be so to varying 
degrees. He describes these divisions in Partial Synopsis of a Proposed Work in Logic 
(CP 2.92, c. 1902) such that a sign that is degenerate to a lesser degree is an “obsistent 
sign” (index) and has a genuine relation to its object independently of what its 
interpretant is. Examples of obsistent signs are exclamations as indicative of danger, 
and a rap on the door as indicative of a visitor.
A sign that is degenerate to a greater degree is an “originalian sign” (icon), which 
has its signifi cance purely in its quality. An example of this is imagining how
I would act under certain circumstances, as showing me how another man would 
be likely to act. We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is convincing. 
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So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I am led to form an idea of the 
person it represents, it is an Icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure Icon, because I am 
greatly infl uenced by knowing that it is an eff ect, through the artist, caused by the 
original’s appearance, and is thus in a genuine Obsistent relation to that original. 
Besides, I know that portraits have but the slightest resemblance to their originals, 
except in certain conventional respects, and aft er a conventional scale of values, 
etc. (CP 2.92)
Th ird, a genuine sign is, in Peirce’s terms, “transuasional” (symbol), a sign that is only 
realized by its interpretant and exemplifi ed in any utterance of speech: “Th e words 
only stand for the objects they do, and signify the qualities they do, because they will 
determine, in the mind of the auditor, corresponding signs. Th e importance of the 
above divisions, although they are new, has been acknowledged by all logicians who 
have seriously considered them” (CP 2.92).
Peirce went on to draw the grand triune of fi rstness, secondness and thirdness into 
his dichotomy of genuine and degenerate signs:
An Index or Seme (séma) is a Representamen whose Representative character 
consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is an existential 
relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is 
degenerate. A genuine Index and its Object must be existent individuals (whether 
things or facts), and its immediate Interpretant must be of the same character. But 
since every individual must have characters, it follows that a genuine Index may 
contain a Firstness, and so an Icon as a constituent part of it. Any individual is a 
degenerate Index of its own characters. (CP 2.283, 1902–03, Speculative Grammar: 
Th e Icon, Index, and Symbol)
Existentially bound variables in quantifi ed logic serve as present-day examples of 
genuine indexical signs, whereas free variables are degenerate.
8. Particular, singular, universal propositions 
General subjects of propositions are either particular or universal. In addition, 
propositions may themselves be also singular. Peirce took particular propositions 
to be those that transfer the “liberty of choice to the other party, the utterer, and 
consequently the defender of the proposition”.13 Similarly, a singular proposition is 
“one which leaves no liberty of choice as to the singular instance, to either party” 
(MS 515: 20). 
13 MS 515: 20, On the First Principles of Logical Algebra (First Print). To appear in LoF.
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Th ese statements derive from more essential considerations. According to 
Peirce, every proposition is in every aspect either defi nite or individual. Defi nite 
signs or propositions are those to which the principle of contradiction applies, and 
individual signs or propositions are those to which the principle of excluded middle 
applies. Th ese two logical principles are, he rightly claims, derived of more general 
considerations about logical activities, and are not as such beyond dispute. Th ose 
general considerations pertain to the most general relations between signs, logical 
reasoning and the notion of communication between the utterers and the interpreters 
of the signs (Pietarinen 2013a).
Universal propositions are those that are non-individual and thus defi nite, whereas 
particular propositions are indefi nite and thus individual. Singular propositions, then, 
are those that are both defi nite and individual.14
Th e dual of the universal proposition, the particular proposition, does not 
presuppose existence. In fact, existence itself consists of the fact that some particulars 
are true of them. A particular statement, some P, is true not only when some P will 
be a particular statement, but also when P in the statement is replaced by something 
that actually exists. Defi ning existence is an altogether diff erent matter. For Peirce, it 
involves the category of secondness, a confrontation of action and reaction, force and 
resistance, acts of perception without freedom to choose and interpret, an ongoing 
duel between the ego of the momentary self and the non-ego of another momentary 
self. Secondness culminates in the defi nition of existence as a choice that leaves no 
genuine option concerning the application of a predicate: “A proposition which, in 
like manner, leaves its interpreter no freedom of choice as to what it is to be applied 
to, namely, a singular or a particular proposition, asserts existence, – i.e. not merely 
universally predicates existence, but represents that there is, will be, (or would be, but 
this amounts to nothing unless it leads to a ‘will be’) a perceptive act in which that 
which is indicated is forced upon said interpreter” (MS 690).15
Existence is occurrence in the universe of discourse. Th ere are countless existences 
just as there are countless occurrences. A singular collection may be picked from the 
universe by virtue of its co-occurrence with those that exist. Not all there is in the 
universes of discourse has existence: other universes of discourse, or the dimensions of 
the universe can concern entities such as modalities, possible individuals, eventualities, 
actions, interrogatives, imperatives, or tenses. Th e occurrences of singulars are the 
focal points to which the utterer and the interpreter draw their attention: “when 
14 MS 515: 20; MS 690, c. 1901, On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, 
Especially from Testimonies, reprinted partially in EP 2:75–114 and in CP 7.164–231 and, most 
comprehensively, in W6.
15 From the missing page 2 of the original HP: 737, reprinted in Companion to EP 2, Selection 
8, Page 98, Line 12, Note 31, Peirce Edition Project, Electronic Supplement.
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the subject is not a proper name, or other designation of an individual within the 
experience (proximate or remote) of both speaker and auditor, the place of such 
designation is taken by a virtual precept stating how the hearer is to proceed in 
order to fi nd an object to which the proposition is intended to refer” (CP 2.357, 1901, 
Speculative Grammar: Propositions). Th e need for existential presuppositions for 
singular existences evaporates in the wake of existence as occurrence.
Th is possibility of occurrences that do not exist has not been given due attention 
in the literature. However, it also prompts new questions. For we need to be able to 
identify occurrences and events in addition to individual objects. And that calls for 
identifi cation of occurrences (‘no eventuality without identity’). Are they the same 
entities that get repeated in the universe of discourse? Are the occurrences, and not 
just the objects, vague or indefi nite? How to represent the temporal aspect of events 
and occurrences?16
9. Qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns
Peirce’s best-known division of signs was into three main trichotomies. Th e icon–
index–symbol one is the second, and is made according to the sign’s characters in its 
relation to its object. Th e third derives from whether the interpretant represents sign's 
relation to its object as a sign of possibility, of fact, or of reason, namely as rhemas, 
propositions (dicisigns) or arguments (CP 2.243, c.1903, Speculative Grammar: Division 
of Signs). Th e fi rst concerns the division of signs (or representamens) per se. Th ese are 
the sign’s quality, its actual existence, and its being a general law. Th ese Peirce terms the 
qualisign, sinsign and legisign, respectively: “A qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. 
It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing 
to do with its character as a sign” (CP 2.244). It is by means of signs of qualities that 
one defi nes simple signs, or the sinsigns (tokens), signs of an actually extant entity or 
event. A sinsign can only exist “through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or 
rather, several qualisigns” (CP 2.245). Th irdly, a legisign (type) is a law that is a sign, 
“usually established by men” (CP 2.246). An example is a conventional sign of a general 
type, the signifi cation of which is by its application. As each individual instance of 
such an application is a sinsign, every legisign contains sinsigns.
16 Time is a well-studied substance of modern logic. Peirce’s unacknowledged contribution to its 
development is noteworthy: he conducted several studies not only on Kant’s conception of time 
but also on the possibility of having a real logic of time, and so time is in no way to be thought to 
be an extra-logical matter. In LN: 340r (7 January 1909) he considered propositions that “are true 
sometimes” and those that are true “under all circumstances”. Earlier, on 20 September 1905, he 
hinted that probability calculus depends on an essential property of time of “the future being like 
the past”, which ought to aff ord the key to the nature of time (LN: 249r).
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10. Ten genera of signs 
Bringing the three main trichotomies together we get the three-fold classifi cation of 
signs which engenders the ten genera of signs:
 Sign   Object   Interpretant
Firstness  Qualisign  Icon   Rhema
Secondness  Sinsign   Index   Proposition
Th irdness  Legisign  Symbol  Argument
Th ere are four reductions and interrelations between cells in this matrix: (1) Every 
qualisign is an icon; (2) every icon is a rhema; (3) every argument is a symbol; and (4) 
every symbol is a legisign (MS L 237: 4–5, 27 July 1904). Consequently, Peirce ended 
up with ten genera of signs: qualisigns, iconic sinsigns, rhematic indexical sinsigns, 
propositional (dicisignifi cant) sinsigns, iconic legisigns, rhematic indexical legisigns, 
propositional (dicisignifi cant) indexical legisigns, rhematic symbols, propositional 
(dicisignifi cant) symbols and arguments (CP 2.264, c. 1903).
It has frequently been acknowledged that the main types of signs and their 
interrelations and contact points may be represented in a triangular form that has ten 
signs in the centre, as this arrangement allows for most interactions with other signs. 
Th e central place that indexical signs enjoy is by no means coincidental or without 
consequence: when Peirce discovered his major division of signs he began to regard 
indexical notions as increasingly prominent not only in his theory of signs but also 
in the emerging new logic of quantifi ers and in the method of existential graphs. Th at 
which is called the existential quantifi er in the general algebra of logic and that which 
is the line of identity in existential graphs both make use of indexicality yet need not 
bear existential presuppositions (CP 2.283; Pietarinen 2006a).
11. Informed, essential, and substantial breadth and depth 
Th ese notions throw us back to the early phases of the development of Peirce’s 
architectonics. Th e act of predication, namely the joining of the object to its subject, 
is a way of increasing the logical breadth of a sign without diminishing its logical 
depth. Breadth and depth refer to what more customarily is known as the denotation 
and connotation of logical terms.
Peirce classifi ed breadth and depth as informed, essential and substantial. Th e 
informed breadth of a term means “all the real things of which it is predicable, with 
logical truth on the whole in a supposed state of information” (CP 2.407, 1867). Th e 
informed depth means “all the real characters which can be predicated of it (with 
logical truth, on the whole) in a supposed state of information” (CP 2.408).
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Th e ground of the object was taken in Peirce’s early philosophy to refer to the 
connotation of a symbolic sign, the second of the three-way notion of reference. 
Th e fi rst is the direct reference of a symbol to its objects, namely the denotation of 
the symbol. Th e second, connotation, is the reference of the symbol to the common 
characters of its object, in other words, to its ground through its object. Th e third is 
the reference of the symbol to its interpretants through its object, which Peirce termed 
the information of the symbol.
Th e symbol’s direct reference to its object is an example of informed breadth, and 
its reference to the ground of the object is an example of informed depth. 
Whatever reference there is to its interpretant is the information concerning 
the symbol (CP 2.418). Later, Peirce subsumed the ground under interpretants. Th e 
informed breadth and depth of a term lie between the two extremes of the states of 
information of which no fact is known and of which there is perfect knowledge of 
all there is. So there are two other states of information that correspond to these 
extremities. First, Peirce distinguishes the essential depth of a term, by which he 
means “the really conceivable qualities predicated of it in its defi nition” (CP 2.410). 
Th e second is the substantial breadth of the term, “the aggregate of real substances of 
which alone a term is predicable with absolute truth”. Th e substantial depth, in turn, “is 
the real concrete form which belongs to everything of which a term is predicable with 
absolute truth” (CP 2.414). For completeness, the essential breadth is all the objects the 
sign refers to by virtue of the defi nition of the object off ered through the interpretant.
Peirce did not distinguish the three aspects of breadth and the three aspects 
of depth from one another by the distinction of supposed vs. imaginary states of 
information. One might have expected such a distinction in the light of the later idea 
of intensions, or modalities that involve multiplicities of diff erent ‘possible worlds’ 
in which statements are evaluated. But his notion of a “perfect state of information”, 
as it was phrased in the late MS 664, could be taken to correspond to sets of possible 
worlds according to which all worlds are linked by equivalence relations (MS 664, Th e 
Rationale of Reasoning, November 1910). Th e “perfect state” explains what it means 
that the representation of all the characters involved in the uttered word is the state 
that contains no ignorance (Pietarinen 2006b).
Peirce’s struggles with the breadth and depth in his early writings called for more 
extensive divisions of signs that also take objects and interpretants into account. 
In particular, Peirce classifi ed interpretants in manifold ways. It is here that we are 
witnessing the emergence of a truly dynamic and nearly complete theory of signs.
12. Varieties of interpretants
Signs cannot stand alone. Th e ways in which they represent or impart information of 
objects is given by a further development of signs. Signs are interpreted as something or 
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as signifying things, typically with reference to their interpreters. Such interpretation is 
itself a sign, but a subsequent one not identical to the interpreted sign. Th is subsequent 
sign is the interpretant of the previous sign. We can think of it as the value of a 
function, or as a functional interpretation of a sign.
Th e relation of every sign to its object and its interpretant is triadic, manifesting the 
thesis that three-place relations cannot be composed out of one and two-place relations 
alone. While a sign represents objects, and in virtue of that representation conveys 
something about it, the idea that the sign gives rise to is its interpretant. It is this idea 
of the sign that gives us information according to which we can look for its objects.
Th e system of such functions is sometimes termed semiosis. It is “an action, or 
infl uence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its 
object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative infl uence not being in any way resolvable 
into actions between pairs” (CP 5.484, 1907, A Survey of Pragmaticism). Although the 
term ‘semiosis’ is merely a hapax in Peirce’s corpus, the idea behind it is commonplace.
Th e representation of an object by a sign is therefore mediated in its interpretants. 
Interpretants need not materialize in the mind. If there is no such material part for the 
interpretants, we can regard interpretations of objects deferred indefi nitely into the 
future. Interpretants need not be actualized: there is an element of potentiality and 
modality in them.
Th e following snippet makes a helpful distinction between three kinds of 
interpretants, namely immediate, imperfect and indirect interpretants:
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since 
its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may 
have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be 
an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an 
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for 
an imperfect Interpretant. (CP 2.294, c. 1902)
Th is passage suggests that the fi rst group refers to several kinds of immediate 
interpretants related to the anterior states of information and initial stages of semiosis. 
Th ey give what the common sense is prone to call the meaning. Among the immediate 
ones are: (1) essential interpretants, which come in minimal states of information; 
(2) the lowest grades of word meaning in initial states of information; (3) intentional 
interpretants, or those determined in the mind of the utterer; and (4) immediate 
interpretants, or those which the signs express without interference from the utterer 
or the interpreter, such as grammatical, morphosyntactic and phonological aspects 
of when linguistic signs are in question.
Th e second group includes dynamic interpretants, which carry further the objective 
content of the actual, synchronic processes of interpretation. Because they are related 
to interpretation, they do not consist exclusively of dynamic interpretants, which 
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Peirce defi ned as “the actual eff ect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines” (CP 
4.536, 1906, Prolegomena). Th ey also encompass eff ectual interpretants, which are 
the interpretants produced in the minds of the interpreters by the signs uttered or 
intended to be uttered by the utterer.
At the receiving end of semiosis rests, thirdly, the class of fi nal interpretants. Th ey 
are “that which would fi nally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration 
of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached” (CP 8.184, 
1903, Review of Lady Welby, What is Meaning?; Pietarinen 2009). Many types of fi nal 
interpretants are found in Peirce’s various attempts to complete his system of semeiotic. 
(1) Communicational interpretants are those that are common and shared in semiosis, 
conceived of as a communicational and dialogical act of interpretation. Th eir successful 
mediation requires common ground with presuppositions and knowledge drawn from 
common experiences. (2) Final, habitual or logical interpretants give rise to habits, that 
is, modifi cations to participants’ dispositions and beliefs of acting in a certain way 
in certain circumstances. (3) Rational, normal or fi nal interpretants are value-bound, 
normative interpretants used in judging other forms of fi nal interpretants. (4) Eventual, 
fi nal, normal or ultimate logical interpretants designate maximal states of information 
with no ignorance, and so there the sign’s object and the interpretant become one. 
Maximal states of information are given in the substantial depth and breadth of the 
symbol. 
Th us iterations of interpretations do reach those fi nal, terminating nexûs that 
reveal relevant information about the object and its reality. No infi nite or endless 
semiosis is to be feared of. 
Around 1906 Peirce nevertheless had to “confess that my own conception of this 
third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist” (CP 4.536). Th e later writings clarify it 
in no signifi cant degree, but the emphasis on the role of communicational interpretants 
that grew aft er 1906 sheds new light on this class. By August 1906, in referring to his 
attempts to classify interpretants Peirce admitted that his notions are too narrow, 
adding that “instead of ‘Sign’, ought I not to say Medium?” (LN: 283r).
Th e classifi cation of interpretants presented here is convincing in its extensive 
coverage of Peirce’s corpus. It shows that interpretants are the dynamic, informational, 
epistemic and communicational states of those who participate in semiosis. Th e 
accuracy of the classifi cation, given in a synoptic form in the Logic Notebook,17 is 
vindicated by his admission two days later that he had drawn this synopsis without 
recollecting anything about his earlier divisions of interpretants.
Whether we fully believe the veracity of this admission or not, the chief aspect of 
semiosis is that the participants are not only, or even principally, any actual utterers 
17  See e.g. 288r–289r, 23 October 1906, as well as the transcriptions in the “Division of signs”, 
this issue.
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and interpreters in concrete conversational settings. Semiosis concerns imaginary 
thought-experiments, and what would or could be there in the quasi-minds of quasi-
utterers and quasi-interpreters, especially as represented in diagrammatic forms (MS 
293, PAP, late 1906 to early 1907). Such imaginary contents of the Phemic sheet, as 
a representation of what Peirce terms the phaneron, and the analysis of both formal 
and material parts of the indecomposable elements of the phaneron in the system 
of existential graphs, was thought by Peirce to be essential to the ultimate erection 
of the theory of signs, especially as one needs to deal in those fi nal divisions with 
conditionals, non-declarative assertions, moods and modalities, commands, questions, 
speech acts, feelings, intentions, and so on, and to logically analyse their meaning 
(Pietarinen 2005b, 2006a, 2008, LoF).
Th e following passage confi rms that objects also are categorized according to similar 
principles. No Kantian noumena transpire: the two kinds of objects, immediate and 
dynamic, are the necessary and suffi  cient ones in the object-category side of the triad:
I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter 
being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by 
determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination 
is the Interpretant. But it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, 
and more than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate 
Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus 
dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, 
which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its 
Representation. (CP 4.536)
A passage written around the same time corroborates this dichotomy of objects: “Th ere 
are an Immediate Interpretant and a Dynamical Interpretant corresponding closely to 
the Immediate and Dynamical Objects. But there is, in addition, a Final Interpretant, 
to which no particular kind of object corresponds”.18
An alternative trichotomy for interpretants is put forward in CP 5.475–476 
[1906–07, A Survey of Pragmaticism]. Th e fi rst is the emotional interpretant, which 
concerns feelings produced by the sign. Peirce did not consider this to be a useful 
eff ect of the signs as far as the truth is concerned, but sometimes emotion is the sole 
interpretant that the sign produces and sometimes it could be of use in dealing with 
ethical and other matters of vital importance, or even in getting scientifi c inquiry 
off  the ground. Second, the energetic interpretant is a further signifi cant eff ect of 
the emotional interpretant, a mental or physical eff ort or act. Finally, the logical 
interpretant, as described above, produces an eff ect so forceful as to give rise to a 
habit change (Pietarinen 2005a). 
18 MS 295: 28, 1906, rejected pages for the Monist article of 1906. To appear in LoF.
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Th e activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the 
conclusion (if it comes to a defi nite conclusion), is that under given conditions, 
the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he 
may desire a given kind of result. Th e real and living logical conclusion is that 
habit; the verbal formulation merely expresses it. I do not deny that a concept, 
proposition, or argument may be a logical interpretant. I only insist that it cannot 
be the fi nal logical interpretant, for the reason that it is itself a sign of that very 
kind that has itself a logical interpretant. Th e habit alone, which though it may 
be a sign in some other way, is not a sign in that way in which that sign of which 
it is the logical interpretant is the sign. Th e habit conjoined with the motive and 
the conditions has the action for its energetic interpretant; but action cannot be 
a logical interpretant, because it lacks generality. Th e concept which is a logical 
interpretant is only imperfectly so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal 
defi nition, and is as inferior to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal 
defi nition is inferior to the real defi nition. Th e deliberately formed, self-analyzing 
habit – self-analyzing because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that 
nourished it – is the living defi nition, the veritable and fi nal logical interpretant. 
Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will 
consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce. 
But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of 
action to which it gives rise, with the specifi cation of the conditions and of the 
motive? (CP 5.491, 1906–07, A Survey of Pragmaticism)
Alternative readings of this paragraph refer to the role of habits in interpretation. 
Such a perspective has signifi cant logical and pragmatistic repercussions addressed 
in Pietarinen (2006a, Ch. 3). Th e tentative reductions that can be gleaned from 
Peirce’s records in the Logic Notebook suggest that emotional, energetic and logical 
interpretants are subsumed by immediate and dynamic interpretants, whereas all the 
fi nal ones are logical (LN: 299r, 23 October 1906). Th e quotation above asserts that 
not all logical interpretants are fi nal. An immediate interpretant in its fi rstness is a 
quality of feeling and is thus emotional, and a dynamic interpretant in its secondness 
encompasses an exertion of force and is thus energetic. Since dynamic interpretants 
are not fi nal, this eff ect produced upon the interpreter may be a feeling. 
Further divisions arise in Peirce’s later work. Th e triplet of impressional, factual and 
habitual interpretants is put forward in LN: 283r [30 August 1906]. Earlier, the “proper 
interpretant” (MS L 427: 4, 25 July 1904) is meant to be the sign’s relation in respect 
to its aspect of thirdness, over and above the respects of fi rstness and secondness. It 
is the “naïve understanding of the sign” (MS L 427: 4), which does not possess the 
qualities of a “refl ective” interpretant. Peirce also talks about objective, actual, middle, 
rational and normal interpretants, but here his descriptions remain incomplete. Such 
diff erences in interpretants as epitomized in his later writings became central to the 
erection of his philosophy of pragmati(ci)sm and its proof (Pietarinen, Snellman 2005; 
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Pietarinen 2011b). For further information on the division of interpretants, the reader 
is referred to the transcription in this issue of those classes that Peirce himself came 
to highlight as well as to the abundant secondary literature.19
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Систематическое изучение знаков: приглашение в теорию Пирса
Дается обзор примечательных тем и понятий, которые встречаются в разных областях 
пирсовского научного наследия – в теории знаков, их классификациях и категориях, 
в логике и «семейотике». 
Märkide süstemaatiline uurimine: kutse Peirce’i teooria juurde
See sissejuhatav kirjutis annab ülevaate tähelepanu väärivatest teemadest ja mõistetest, mis 
esinevad Charles Peirce’i mõttemaailma omavahel seotud valdkondades: märgiteoorias, 
märkide klassifi tseerimises, kategooriates, loogikas ning ‘semeiootikas’.
